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Abstract—For a physical layer message authentication proce-
dure based on the comparison of channel estimates obtained from
the received messages, we focus on an outer bound on the type
I/II error probability region. Channel estimates are modelled as
multivariate Gaussian vectors, and we assume that the attacker
has only some side information on the channel estimate, which
he does not know directly. We derive the attacking strategy
that provides the tightest bound on the error region, given the
statistics of the side information. This turns out to be a zero
mean, circularly symmetric Gaussian density whose correlation
matrices may be obtained by solving a constrained optimization
problem. We propose an iterative algorithm for its solution:
Starting from the closed form solution of a relaxed problem,
we obtain, by projection, an initial feasible solution; then, by an
iterative procedure, we look for the fixed point solution of the
problem. Numerical results show that for cases of interest the
iterative approach converges, and perturbation analysis shows
that the found solution is a local minimum.
Index Terms—Authentication, Physical layer security, Rayleigh
fading channels, Hypothesis testing
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security provides an effective defense mech-
anism which is complementary to higher layer security tech-
niques. Indeed, it has the potential of resisting the attacks
based on computational capabilities that may be feasible
in the near future, e.g., by quantum computing. Moreover,
security implemented at the physical layer is usually based on
information theoretic arguments [1]. It therefore entails ana-
lytically predictable performance irrespective of the attacker
capabilities and has found recently application to widely used
communication systems [2], [3]. One of the most desirable
mechanisms of physical layer security is the authentication of
the message source. This key task can be conveniently recast
into a hypothesis testing problem [4], [5], namely to decide
between hypothesis H0 that the message was effectively sent
by the legitimate source, and hypothesis H1 that it was forged
by the attacker.
Physical layer authentication has been addressed by consid-
ering either device-specific non-ideal transmission parameters
extracted from the received signal [6], or channel character-
istics to identify the link between a specific source and the
receiver [7]–[9]. In this paper we focus on the latter case,
which finds application in many wideband wireless systems,
where even small changes in the position of the transmitter
have a significant impact on the channel. In particular, we
consider the approach of [9], where the test is performed in
two phases. In the first phase, the receiver gets an authenticated
noisy estimate x of the channel with respect to the legitimate
transmitter. In the second phase, upon reception of a message,
the receiver gets a new estimate u of the channel and compares
it with x. Then, he must decide whether u is an estimate of the
legitimate channel or the channel forged by an eavesdropper.
The performance of a binary hypothesis testing scheme is
measured by the probability of type I (false alarm), and type II
(missed detection) errors. Therefore, theoretical bounds on the
achievable error probability region are of great importance to
establish the effectiveness of practical schemes. For instance,
[4] considered the traditional authentication scenario in which
the legitimate parties can make use of a shared cryptographic
key that is kept perfectly secret to the attackers. There, an outer
bound on the achievable error region was derived, that holds
irrespectively of the decision rule implemented by the receiver.
Then, by fixing the false alarm probability, the outer bound is
turned into a lower bound on the missed detection probability.
An analogous approach was used in [10] and [11] within
the different contexts of steganography and fingerprinting,
respectively. Similarly, in [5], such lower bound is paired with
an asymptotic upper bound, and both are derived also in the
case that the legitimate parties share correlated sequences,
instead of an identical key.
In the above cases, since the attacker has no information on
the shared sequences, the optimal attack strategy with respect
to the outer bound is to present forged signals that, albeit
independent of the legitimate shared key, are generated from
the same marginal distribution as the legitimate signals. In
our framework, on the contrary, the legitimate authentication
signal is the actual realization of a fading wireless chan-
nel. Thus the attacker has some side information given by
the channel estimates z he performs, which are in general
correlated with the legitimate channel. We model channel
estimates as correlated multivariate Gaussian vectors, which is
a usual assumption in wireless transmissions, including those
using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) or
multiple input multiple output (MIMO).
The contribution of our paper is thus threefold: 1) we derive
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Fig. 1. Transmission channel scenario for the physical layer authentication problem.
an outer bound to the error probability region, in terms of the
attacker strategy; 2) we prove the existence of a strategy v,
jointly Gaussian with z, that yields the tightest bound, and
characterize the covariance through the solution of a system
of two matrix equations; 3) we give an efficient technique for
the numerical evaluation of the optimal attack strategy and the
corresponding bound.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the
problem formally, so that the theoretical results can be derived
in Section III. Based on those results, in Section IV we propose
an efficient algorithm for the numerical evaluation of the
optimal attack strategy. Then, in Section V we give examples
of numerical results, and eventually we draw conclusions in
Section VI.
In our notation, if a ∈ Cn and b ∈ Cm are random vectors,
Kab denotes the n × m covariance matrix of vectors a and
b, whereas K[ a
b
] stands for the (n+m)× (n+m) variance
matrix of the vector
[
a
b
]
. The symbol A∗ denotes the complex
conjugate transpose of matrix A.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the physical layer channel authentication
scheme depicted in Fig. 1 where agents Alice (A) and Eve (E)
transmit messages to Bob (B), and Bob aims at authenticating
messages from Alice, i.e., reliably detecting whether she sent
them or not. The authentication is performed via a two phase
procedure, as detailed in [9]:
a) First Phase: In this phase, illustrated in Fig. 1(a) Alice
transmits one or more messages, denoted by sIA, whose authen-
ticity is guaranteed by higher layer techniques, to Bob, through
the channel hAB. Bob gets a noisy estimate hˆIAB of the channel
with respect to Alice and replies with an acknowledgement
message. Moreover, by leveraging transmissions by Alice and
Bob, Eve obtains (possibly noisy) estimates hˆAE, hˆBE of the
channels that link her to both agents.
b) Second Phase: Subsequently, as shown in Fig. 1(b),
either Alice or Eve transmit messages sA or sE, respectively.
Bob authenticates the received messages by getting a new
noisy channel estimate hˆ and comparing it with his template
hˆIAB. If this decision process D deems the message as coming
3pxyz
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Fig. 2. Abstract model for physical layer authentication cast as an hypothesis
testing problem with channel estimates as the available observations.
from Alice, the binary flag bˆ is set to zero, otherwise it is
set to one. In this phase, Alice performs transmissions in a
similar fashion as the first phase, yet the new estimate hˆIIAB of
the Alice-Bob channel will not be identical to hˆIAB, in general,
due to the independent noises that affect both estimates. On
the other hand, Eve can perform a pre-processing of her own
messages in order to induce an equivalent channel estimate by
Bob that is as close as possible to hˆIAB.
From now on, for the sake of a more compact notation,
we let x = hˆIAB, y = hˆ
II
AB, z = (hˆAE, hˆBE), u = hˆ and
we refer to the abstract representation of the authentication
scenario given in Fig. 2. There, the joint probability density
function (pdf) pxyz of the channel estimates is determined by
the fading environment and the estimation techniques adopted
by the agents, which are assumed known by all of them.
In order to consider a worst case scenario, we assume that
Eve is able to forge any equivalent channel estimate v on
Bob, neglecting the fact that power constraints and/or channel
characteristics may prevent this and restrict the set of possible
attacks, in practice. As a side effect, this assumptions also
allows to simplify our analysis. The attacker’s forging strategy
can make use of the information carried by her observations
z, and in order to allow her the most generality, we consider
that she can make use of a probabilistic strategy, which is thus
characterized by the conditional pdf pv|z . Note that, although
our framework considers a single forging attempt, it can be
extended to a sequence of attempts {vi}, i = 1, 2, . . ., where
the attacker strategy is represented by the family of conditional
pdfs
{
pvi|z,v1,...,vi−1
}
.
Given the channel estimate u, Bob decides between the two
hypotheses
H0 : u = y message is from Alice , (1)
H1 : u = v message was forged. (2)
In Fig. 2, being in hypothesis H0 or H1 is obtained by setting
b = 0 or 1, respectively. Correct authentication is achieved
when bˆ = b.
Recall that all channels are described by zero-mean cir-
cular symmetric complex Gaussian vectors with correlated
entries, as a suitable model for many scenarios (including
MIMO/OFDM). Moreover, we assume that all transmissions
are corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise with zero
mean. Similarly, we assume that also the channel estimates are
zero-mean circular symmetric complex Gaussian vectors with
correlated entries.1 In particular, x, and y are n-dimensional,
complex, circular symmetric Gaussian random vectors, z is an
m-dimensional, complex, circular symmetric Gaussian random
vector. On the other hand v is an n-dimensional, complex,
random vector whose probability density is not specified as
it will be chosen by the attacker in order to obtain better
mimetic features. We denote the set of all possible conditional
distributions (forging strategies) pv|z(·|·) as
Q =
{
q(·|·) : Cn × Cm → R, q(b|c) ≥ 0,
∫
q(b|c) db = 1
}
.
(3)
Performance of the authentication system are assessed by
type I error probability α, i.e., the probability that Bob discards
a message as forged by Eve while it is coming from Alice
α = P[bˆ = 1|H0] , (4)
and the type II error probability β, i.e., the probability that
Bob accepts a message coming from Eve as legitimate
β = P[bˆ = 0|H1] . (5)
The aim of a clever design for the authentication scheme is
to make both error probabilities α and β as small as possible.
Since it is trivial to achieve α+β = 1 with a random decision
strategy that outputs bˆ = 1 with probability α, independently
of the observation u, we are only interested in values of α, β
in the region
R0 = {(α, β) : α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, α+ β ≤ 1} . (6)
A. Error Region Bounds for a Given Attacking Strategy
A first bound on the error region for a given attacking
strategy can be obtained by applying the fundamental data pro-
cessing inequality for the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
[13] to our binary hypothesis decision scheme D. In fact, from
[4], [10] we have2
D
(
pbˆ|H1 || pbˆ|H0
)
≤ D (pxu|H1 || pxu|H0) . (7)
First we observe that pbˆ|H0(1) = α, pbˆ|H0(0) = 1 − α,
and similarly pbˆ|H1(0) = β, pbˆ|H1(1) = 1 − β. Therefore,
introducing the function3
f (ϕ,ψ) = ϕ log
ϕ
1− ψ + (1− ϕ) log
1− ϕ
ψ
, ϕ, ψ ∈ [0, 1]
(8)
we can rewrite (7) as
f(β, α) ≤ D (pxu|H1 || pxu|H0) . (9)
1This is justified by the fact that, in order to be effective, estimates should
have a distribution that is close to that of the target variable. Furthermore,
under mild assumptions on the SNR and with a sufficient amount of data,
errors in, e.g. an ML estimation, are asymptotically unbiased, efficient and
Gaussian distributed themselves [12, §7.8].
2Note that the symmetric bound D
(
pbˆ|H0 || pbˆ|H1
)
≤
D (pxu|H0 || pxu|H1) holds as well (see also [9]).
3Notice that f(ϕ,ψ) is the KL divergence between two Bernoulli proba-
bility distributions of parameters ϕ and 1− ψ, respectivley.
4Since the observation z encloses all the information the
attacker can exploit in order to deceive the receiver, we can
assume that the forging strategy v is conditional independent
of the secure template x, given z. Then the divergence on the
right side of (9) can be written explicitly for a given attacking
strategy q(·|·) ∈ Q as
D(q) = D (pxu|H1 || pxu|H0) = D (pxv || pxy)
=
∫ ∫ [∫
pxz(a, c)q(b|c) dc
]
×[
log
(∫
pxz(a, c)q(b|c) dc
)
− log pxy(a, b)
]
da db .
(10)
Let f0 ≥ 0 be given and set
R (f0) :=
{
(α, β) ∈ R0 : f(β, α) ≤ f0
}
. (11)
Then (9) can be rewritten as
(α, β) ∈ R (D(q)) . (12)
B. Error Region Bounds for Any Attacking Strategy
Each outer bound in (12) is clearly looser than
R∩ =
⋂
q∈Q
R (D(q)) = R (D?) (13)
where
D? = inf
q∈Q
D(q) . (14)
Note that the region in (13) is not strictly speaking an outer
bound of the type (12), since the infimum (14) may not be
achievable, in general. In that case, (13) represents a worst case
performance for the authentication system, over all possible
attacking strategies. On the other hand, for the attacker,
approaching (14) represents the possibility to effectively carry
out an impersonation attack.
The main goal of this paper it to evaluate the tightest bound
(13). Indeed, we provide an attacking strategy achieving (14),
under the assumption that the observation z encodes all the
information about the secure template x the attacker can rely
on in order to deceive the receiver. We have just shown that
this is equivalent to the following constrained optimization
problem:
Problem 1: Given the zero-mean, circular symmetric,
jointly Gaussian random vectors x, y, z with joint covariance
matrix
K[ x
y
z
] :=
Kxx Kxy KxzKyx Kyy Kyz
Kzx Kzy Kzz
 , (15)
find a joint probability distribution pxvz ∈ L1(C2n+m) such
that its marginal pxv minimizes D (pxv || pxy) under the con-
straints:
1. The marginal distribution of x, z (corresponding to pxvz) is
equal to the given distribution pxz .
2. The random vectors v and x are conditionally independent
given z.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we address Problem 1. In particular, we show
that the problem is feasible, that it admits an optimal solution
and that this solution is Gaussian. Finally, we show how to
reformulate this problem in terms of solutions of two coupled
matrix equations. The first issue to be considered is the
feasibility of Problem 1, namely the existence of a distribution
pxvz satisfying the constraints and such that D (pxv || pxy) is
finite.
Lemma 1: Problem 1 is feasible.
Proof: Let v be an n-dimensional, complex, zero-mean,
circular symmetric Gaussian random vector (with arbitrary
covariance) independent of x and of z. It is immediate to
check that the corresponding pxvz satisfies the constraints and
is such that D (pxv || pxy) is finite.
Lemma 2: Let x and z be jointly Gaussian. For any attack-
ing strategy pxv having finite second moment and in which
v and x are conditionally independent given z, they are also
conditionally orthogonal given z, that is
E
[
(x− E¯[x|z])(v − E¯[v|z])] = 0, (16)
where E¯[·|z] stands for the best linear estimator of · given z
Proof: We have
E
[
(x− E¯[x|z])(v − E¯[v|z])] (17)
= E
[
E
[
(x− E¯[x|z])(v − E¯[v|z])|z]] (18)
= E
[
E
[
(x− E¯[x|z])|z]E [(v − E¯[v|z])|z]] (19)
= E
[(
E[x|z]− E¯[x|z]) (E[v|z]− E¯[v|z])] , (20)
where (18) and (19) follow from the Total Expectation Theo-
rem and the definition of conditional independence, respec-
tively. Since x and z are jointly Gaussian, we have that
E [x|z] = E¯[x|z]. Thus, we can conclude that the right-hand
side of (20) is equal to zero.
In general, conditional independence does not imply con-
ditional orthogonality, although for jointly Gaussian variables
they are equivalent. However, we have proved that conditional
independence of x and v given z implies that x and v are
conditionally orthogonal given z, thanks to x and z being
jointly Gaussian.
Let us recall the joint covariance matrix (15)
K[ x
v
z
] :=
Kxx Kxv KxzKvx Kvv Kvz
Kzx Kzv Kzz
 . (21)
Notice that, since the attacker knows the joint probability
density pxyz , the corner elements of (21) are known. For the
sake of simplicity, we introduce the following symbols for the
unknown blocks of (21):
X := Kvv, Y := Kxv, Z := Kvz. (22)
Hence, we can write
K[ x
v
z
] =
Kxx Y KxzY ∗ X Z
K∗xz Z
∗ Kzz
 . (23)
5Recall that the conditional orthogonality of x and v given z is
equivalent to the following zero-block pattern in its inverse4
K−1[ x
v
z
] =
∗ 0 ∗0 ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗
 . (24)
In this way we have expressed the second constraint of
Problem 1 in terms of the structure of the inverse of the
covariance matrix. We can therefore enforce this constraint by
resorting to a “maximum entropy” completion as described in
[15], see also [16] for a more general result and [17] for an
application of this technique.
Lemma 3: If qG is a circular symmetric Gaussian distribu-
tion, then, among all distributions p that share the same mean
vector µ and covariance matrix K, the one that minimizes
D (p || qG) is circular symmetric and Gaussian.
Proof: Let pG be a circular symmetric Gaussian proba-
bility density on Cn and let p 6= pG be any density having
the same first and second moment as pG. We denote by
H(p) the differential entropy of the density p, i.e. H(p) :=
− ∫ p(a) log p(a) da. Then (see [18, Theorem 2]), we have the
inequality
H(p) < H(pG). (25)
Now let qG be any proper Gaussian density on Cn. Under the
same hypotheses, we have∫
log qG(x)p(x)dx =
∫
log qG(x)pG(x)dx, (26)
because log qG(x) is a quadratic function of x. In view of (25)
and (26), we now have
D(p‖qG) =
∫
log
p(x)
qG(x)
p(x)dx
= −H(p)−
∫
log qG(x)p(x)dx
= −H(p)−
∫
log qG(x)pG(x)dx
≥ −H(pG)−
∫
log qG(x)pG(x) = D(pG‖qG),
with equality iff pG is circular symmetric and Gaussian.
Thus, if p is the solution of any minimum entropy problem
with circular symmetric Gaussian prior, p has to be circular
symmetric and Gaussian.
Lemma 4: If the second moment of pxv is not finite then
D (pxv || pxy) =∞.
Proof: We assume that D (pxv || pxy) is finite and show
that the second moment of pxv is finite. Let us first recall the
variational formula for the relative entropy [19, page 68]:
D (pxv || pxy) = sup
ϕ∈Φ
{∫
C2n
ϕ(a)pxv(a)da−
log
[∫
C2n
exp[ϕ(a)]pxy(a)da
]} (27)
where Φ is the set of bounded functions. Observe now that,
since pxy is a Gaussian probability density, there exists ε > 0
4A proof can be worked out in the same vein of [14, Section 2].
such that
L := Epxy [exp[ε‖a‖2]] =
∫
C2n
exp[ε‖a‖2]pxy(a)da
is finite. Let us now consider the following sequence of
bounded functions:
ϕl(a) :=
{
ε‖a‖2, if ‖a‖2 ≤ l,
0, if ‖a‖2 > l.
From (27) we get that for all l = 1, 2, . . . ,
D (pxv || pxy) + log
[∫
C2n
exp[ϕl(a)]pxy(a)da
]
≥∫
C2n
ϕl(a)pxv(a)da,
(28)
or, equivalently,
1
ε
{
D (pxv || pxy) + log
[∫
C2n
exp[ϕl(a)]pxy(a)da
]}
≥∫
Ωl
‖a‖2pxv(a)da,
(29)
where Ωl := {a ∈ C2n : ‖a‖2 ≤ l}. As l → ∞, the left-
hand side of (29) converges to 1ε [D (pxv || pxy) +L] while the
right hand side converges to the trace of the second moment
of pxv . Such a trace is therefore finite and thus also the second
moment of pxv is finite.
We are now ready to consider the existence problem. As in
many optimization problems this is one of the most delicate
issue.
Theorem 1: There exists an optimal solution p?xv of Prob-
lem 1.
Proof: Let d? be the infimum of D (pxv || pxy) over pxv ,
satisfying the constraints of Problem 1. Let pjxvz , j = 1, 2, . . . ,
be a sequence of probability densities satisfying the constraints
of Problem 1 and such that the corresponding marginals pjxv
satisfy
lim
j→∞
D (pjxv || pxy) = d?.
In view of Lemma 4, we can assume that all pjxvz have finite
mean vector µj and covariance matrix K¯j . Let mj and Kj
be the mean and covariance of [ xv ], i.e. mj are the first 2n
components of µj and Kj is the 2n × 2n upper-left block
of K¯j . Now notice that, as j → ∞, ‖Kj‖ and ‖mj‖ remain
bounded. In fact, in view of Lemma 3,
D (pjxv || pxy) ≥ D (pGjxv || pxy) =
trace [K−1[ x
y
]Kj ] +m∗jK−1[ x
y
]mj − ln
 det[Kj ]
det[K[ x
y
]]
− 2n,
(30)
where pGjxv is the Gaussian distribution having mean vector
mj and covariance matrix Kj . It is easy to check that the
right-hand side of (30) diverges if at least one of ‖Kj‖ and
‖mj‖ does. Hence, both ‖Kj‖ and ‖mj‖ remain bounded.
Thus, also µj and K¯j remain bounded. Therefore, there exists
a subsequence pjixvz such that K¯ji and µji converge. Let K¯
?
and µ? be their limits and let K? and m? be the limits of Kji
6and mji . Notice now that each density of the corresponding
sequence pGjixvz satisfies the constraints of Problem 1. In fact,
the marginal pxz does not change and, in view of (24),
the second constraint only depends on the variance matrix.
Therefore, also the Gaussian distribution pG?xvz , whose mean
and variance are K¯? and µ?, satisfies the constraints of
Problem 1. Let pG?xv be the corresponding marginal. We have
d? = lim
i→∞
D (pjixv || pxy) ≥ lim
i→∞
D (pGjixv || pxy)
= lim
i→∞
trace [K−1[ x
y
]Kji ] +m∗jiK−1[ x
y
]mji−
+ ln
 det[Kji ]
det[K[ x
y
]]
− 2n (31)
= trace [K−1[ x
y
]K?] + (m?)∗K−1[ x
y
]m?−
+ ln
 det[K?]
det[K[ x
y
]]
− 2n (32)
= D (pG?xv || pxy) . (33)
Thus pG?xvz solves Problem 1.
Notice that from (33) it is immediate to see that the optimal
solution not only exists but is Gaussian distributed with zero
mean.
Corollary 1: Let x and y be jointly Gaussian. Then the
solution of Problem 1 is zero mean and Gaussian.
We are now ready to find the solution of our problem.
Theorem 2: The solution of Problem 1 is the zero mean
circular symmetric Gaussian density p?xvz whose covariance
matrix is
K[ x
v
z
](Z,C) =
 Kxx KxzK−1zz Z∗ KxzZK−1zz K∗xz ZK−1zz Z∗ + CC∗ Z
K∗xz Z
∗ Kzz
 ,
(34)
where Z and C solve
C∗ = C∗(ZK−1zz BK
−1
zz Z
∗ + CC∗)−1A
Z∗ = KzxK−1xxKxy +BK
−1
zz Z
∗(ZK−1zz BK
−1
zz Z
∗+
+CC∗)−1A
(35)
with
A := Kyy −K∗xyK−1xxKxy, (36)
B := Kzz −K∗xzK−1xxKxz. (37)
Proof: See the Appendix.
In view of (10) and (13), Theorem 2 provides the tightest
bound to the error region (13). Indeed, let K[ x
v
] be a shorthand
notation for the 2n× 2n upper-left corner of (34). Then, D?
is given by
D? = D(p?xv‖pxy) = − log det(K[ x
v
]K−1[ x
y
])+
+traceK[ x
y
]−1(K[ x
v
] −K[ x
y
]) . (38)
Consider the circular symmetric Gaussian density p?xvz , with
zero mean and variance
K[ x
v
z
] =
 Kxx KxzK−1zz Z∗ KxzZK−1zz K∗xz ZK−1zz Z∗ + CC∗ Z
K∗xz Z
∗ Kzz
 . (39)
Note that it is such that x and v are conditionally independent
given z. Then, by marginalizing and conditioning, we can
obtain an optimum attacking strategy p?v|z(·|a) which achieves
(13). It is given by the proper Gaussian density whose mean
and variance are defined by
µv|z := ZK−1zz a (40)
Kv|z := Kvv −KvzK−1zz K∗vz = CC∗ (41)
IV. EFFICIENT COMPUTATION OF THE TIGHTEST BOUND
In view of Theorem 2, in order to provide the expression of
the optimal solution p?xvz , we have to compute matrices C,Z
which solve the system of nonlinear matrix equations (35).
This appears however to be a highly non trivial task. Thus,
we propose a two stage algorithm:
1) Feasible (projected) Solution. To begin with, we deal
with an optimization problem which can be considered
a relaxed version of Problem 1, since no positivity
constraints on the matrix K[ x
v
z
] are imposed. This task
turns out to be much simpler to achieve. Indeed, the
solution can be computed in closed form. Then, we
project the solution to the relaxed problem onto the
feasible set, i.e. the set of pairs (X,Z) which make
K[ x
v
z
] positive definite.
2) Iterative Algorithm. We use the projection as a starting
point for an iterative update procedure whose fixed point
satisfies (35).
Next we provide some details for each phase.
Feasible Solution. Minimizing (10) with no constraints on the
positivity of K[ x
v
z
] is equivalent to solve
Problem 2:
arg min
X,Z
J(K[ x
v
](Z,X)) :={− log det(K[ x
v
](Z,X)K−1[ x
y
])+
traceK−1[ x
y
]K[ x
v
]}
(42)
where
K[ x
v
](Z,X) := [ Kxx KxzK−1zz Z∗
Z(KxzK
−1
zz )
∗ X
]
, (43)
K[ x
y
] := [Kxx Kxy
K∗xy Kyy
]
. (44)
In the same vein of the proof of Theorem 2, we work out the
optimality conditions that X and Z have to satisfy, based on
the analysis of the first variation D[J(K[ x
v
](Z,X); δK[ x
v
]].
7Some easy algebraic calculations lead us to the closed form
of an optimal solution (Z,X):
Z = K∗xyKxx
−1Kxz(K∗xzK
−1
xxKxz)
†Kzz,
X = Kyy −K∗xyKxx−
1
2 [I−
K
− 12
xx Kxz(K
∗
xzKxx
−1Kxz)†K∗xzK
− 12
xx
]
Kxx
− 12Kxy
(45)
where “ † ” denotes Moore-Penrose pseudo inverse.
If the obtained X and Z are such that X −ZK−1zz K∗ ≥ 0,
the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, a pair (C,Z) is obtained
as follows. Let T be a unitary matrix such that ΣT := T ∗(X−
ZK−1zz K
∗)T = diag(d1, d2, . . . , dk, δ1, δ2, . . . , δh), where di
are positive and in decreasing order, and δi are negative or
zero. Let Σ′T := diag(d1, d2, . . . , dk, ε, ε, . . . , ε), where ε :=
(dk/100) > 0 is a “small” parameter. Let Σ′ := TΣ′TT
∗ > 0
and C be such that CC∗ = Σ′.
Iterative Algorithm. We use the pair (C,Z) as a starting point
for the iterations
C∗(k + 1) = C∗(k)(Z(k)K−1zz BK
−1
zz Z
∗(k) + C(k)C∗(k))−1A,
Z∗(k + 1) = KzxK−1xxKxy+
BK−1zz Z
∗(k)(Z(k)K−1zz BK
−1
zz Z
∗(k) + C(k)C∗(z))−1A
(46)
where
A := Kyy −K∗xyK−1xxKxy (47)
B := Kzz −K∗xzK−1xxKxz. (48)
By the the iterative process we aim at finding a fixed point for
(46), which provides the solution of Problem 1. The iterative
process can be stopped either after a fixed number of iterations,
or when the variation of D∗ over one iteration is smaller than
a given percentage.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Uncorrelated Channels
In order to assess the performance of the proposed algorithm
for the computation of the tightest bound, we first consider the
case where m = n and the covariance matrices are identities,
i.e.
K[ x
y
z
] =
 In σIn ρInσ∗In In τIn
ρ∗In τ∗In In

This scenario corresponds for example to an OFDM transmis-
sion with uncorrelated channel frequency response. Beyond
being an asymptotic case widely considered in the literature,
this is also a practical scenario, when a subset of subcarriers
with cardinality smaller than the number of channel taps is
considered, and the channel taps are independent Gaussian
variables. The parameter ρ dictates the correlation between
channel estimates performed by Eve and the legitimate chan-
nel.
First we assess the performance of the iterative algorithm.
Fig 3 shows the values of the cost of the optimum solution
D∗ as a function of the number of iterations for the iterative
algorithm, with n = m = 64, and various values of ρ. We
observe that the iterative algorithm always converges to a fixed
point for (46) and that the convergence to a solution with good
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Fig. 3. Cost of the solution computed by the iterative algorithm as a
function of the maximum number of iterations, with n = m = 64, for
ρ = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5.
Fig. 4. Bound of the region type II (β) vs type I (α) error probability for
various values of the correlation parameter ρ, with Kxx = In×n, Kzz =
Im×m, and Kxz = ρIn×m.
accuracy takes less than 100 iterations. Thus, in the following
we consider this value for the maximum number of iterations.
Fig. 4 shows the bound of the type II (β) – type I (α)
error probability region for various values of the correlation
parameter ρ, and for n = m = 64, as obtained from the
proposed iterative approach. As expected, we observe that for
increasing values of ρ, the region of achievable values of α
and β gets wider. In particular, for the considered scenario,
the type II error probability is larger than 10−1 already for
ρ = 0.4.
In Fig. 5 we report the results obtained for both the initial
feasible solution (projection of the solution of (45)) and final
solution of the iterative algorithm, as a function of n, for ρ =
0.1,0.5,0.7. For the sake of clarity, we also show the cost of
the solutions provided by the iterative algorithm in Tab. I.
We note that the iterative algorithm remarkably lowers the
value of the cost function from the initial feasible solution,
thus motivating its use, although it comes at a cost of more
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Fig. 5. Cost function D∗ as a function of n for various values of the
correlation parameter ρ, with Kxx = In×n, Kzz = Im×m, and Kxz =
ρIn×m. Both projection and iterative algorithms are considered.
TABLE I
COST OF THE SOLUTION PROVIDED BY THE ITERATIVE SOLUTION.
D∗ n = 2 n = 4 n = 8 n = 16 n = 32 n = 64
ρ = 0.1 1.6099 3.2199 6.4397 12.8795 25.7589 51.5179
ρ = 0.5 0.3047 0.6094 1.2189 2.4378 4.8756 9.7511
ρ = 0.7 0.0005 0.0011 0.0021 0.0042 0.0085 0.0169
computations. Also, as expected, the cost function increases
with n. For the considered case of OFDM transmission,
this means that more dispersive channels having independent
taps provide potentially a better authentication system. This
phenomenon has been already seen in [9].
B. Correlated Channels
We now consider channels with random correlation. We let
m = n and generate K[ x
y
z
] as a realization of a 3n× 3n real
Wishart matrix5. Even in this case we verified that setting
the maximum number of iteration to 100 is enough for the
convergence of the iterative algorithm. Fig. 6.a shows the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of D∗ for two values of
n = m, at the convergence of the iterative algorithm. Also in
this case we observe that a larger n provides a larger value of
D∗. We also report in Fig. 6.b the CDF for the initial feasible
solution obtained by projection.
For the random correlation case, Tab. II shows the probabil-
ity that the closed form solution of the relaxed problem (45)
satisfies the positivity constraint, as a function of n.
5A n × n real (resp., complex) Wishart matrix is a random matrix W
that can be written as W = AA∗, where A is a n × n random matrix
with independent identically distributed (iid) real (resp., circularly symmetric
complex) Gaussian entries. In our case, the entries of A have zero mean and
unit variance.
TABLE II
PROBABILITY THAT (45) IS FEASIBLE, AS A FUNCTION OF n.
n 2 4 8 16 32 64
p [%] 43 10 0 0 0 0
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28
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(a) Iterative algorithm.
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Fig. 6. CDF of the cost function for two values of n.
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Fig. 7. Percentage improvement η as a function of n. Random correlation
matrices and n = m. Perturbation analysis results are included.
Note that as n increases this probability goes fast to zero,
thus making the projection step necessary to obtain an initial
feasible solution for the iterative algorithm.
In order to compare the iterative solution to the one provided
by (45), which may not fulfill the positivity constraints on the
joint covariance matrix, Fig. 7 shows the percentage increase
9of the cost (62) defined as
η := 100×
[
J∗iter
J∗cf
− 1
]
, (49)
where J∗iter is the cost of the solution provided by the iterative
algorithm, whereas J∗cf is the cost of the one computed in
closed form through (45). The analysing of the increment with
regard to J∗ is convenient because D∗cf can vanish. Indeed,
recall that, if K[ x
y
] is a n × n matrix, it holds that D∗ =
J∗ − 2n. We note that the increase is in the range of 20% to
30% for the considered scenario. Moreover, it is diminishing
as n increases. This seems to suggest that, for growing values
of n, the solution computed by means of (45) corresponds to
a matrix of the form (54) which gets closer to the cone of
positive definite matrices of size (2n+m).
We also provide results for the perturbation analysis. In
particular, we evaluate the effects of small perturbations
of Z and C generated as Gaussian random variables with
norm 0.01‖Z‖ and 0.01‖C‖, respectively. Fig. 7 reports the
maximum cost function achieved for all perturbed values,
showing that it provides negligible improvement with respect
to the solution of the iterative approach. This supports the
conclusion that the iterative approach reaches a minimum
point for J(K[ x
v
](Z,C)). We also applied the iterative al-
gorithm starting from the perturbed solutions which led to
cost improvements. Results, not reported here, show that this
procedure achieves very small improvements with an increase
of the cost function of 0.01% .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the problem of deriving a univer-
sal performance bound, for a message source authentication
scheme based on channel estimates in a wireless fading
scenario, where an attacker may have correlated observations
available. We have formulated an outer bound to the region
of achievable false alarm and missed detection probabilities,
which is universal across all possible decision rules by the
receiver.
Under the assumption that the channels are represented
by multivariate complex Gaussian variables, we have proved
that the tightest bound corresponds to a forging strategy that
produces a zero mean signal which is jointly Gaussian with
the attacker observations. Furthermore, we have derived a
characterization of their joint covariance matrix through the
solution of a system of two nonlinear matrix equations. Based
upon this characterization, we have also devised an efficient
iterative algorithm for its computation: the solution to the
matrix system appears as fixed point of the iteration.
From numerical results, we conjecture that the proposed
iterative approach for the best attacking strategy converges in
general, although determining its convergence seems a highly
difficult problem. Moreover, from the perturbation analysis,
we deduce that the limit point is a local minimum. We
have therefore provided an effective method for the attacking
strategy that yields the tightest bound on the error region of
any message authentication procedure.
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix we provide the proof of Theorem 2.
We have already shown that the optimal solution is a zero-
mean Gaussian distribution having covariance matrix of the
form
K[ x
v
z
] =
Kxx Y KxzY ∗ X Z
K∗xz Z
∗ Kzz
 , (50)
where
K[ x
z
] := [Kxx Kxz
K∗xz Kzz
]
> 0
is given. Clearly in this way the first constraint of Problem 1
is automatically satisfied for any X,Y, Z. We now show that
the second constraint is equivalent to impose
Y = KxzK
−1
zz Z
∗.
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M1 =
[
A1 B1
C1 D1
]
⇒ M−11 =
[
(A1 −B1D−11 C1)
−1 −A−11 B1(D1 − C1A−11 B1)
−1
−D−11 C1(A1 −B1D−11 C1)
−1
(D1 − C1A−11 B1)
−1
]
. (51)
Indeed, in view of Lemma 2, x and v are conditional orthogo-
nal given z, so that the inverse of Kxvz must exhibit the zero-
block pattern (24). Based on this information, we can compute
Y as a function of Z and X by employing the block-matrix
inversion formula in (51) at the top of the page We partition
K[ x
v
z
] as
K[ x
v
z
] = [A1 B1
C1 D1
]
, (52)
where
A1 := Kxx, B1 :=
[
Y Kxz
]
,
C1 :=
[
Y ∗
K∗xz
]
, D1 :=
[
X Z
Z∗ Kzz
]
.
Therefore, the block in position (1, 2) of K−1xvz (with respect
to the partition (52)) is given by
−A−11 B1(D1 − C1A−11 B1)
−1
= −Kxx−1
[
Y Kxz
]×([
X Z
Z∗ Kzz
]
−
[
Y ∗
Kzx
]
Kxx
−1 [Y Kxz])−1
= −Kxx−1
[
Y Kxz
]×
[
X − Y ∗Kxx−1Y Z − Y ∗Kxx−1Kxz
Z∗ −KzxK−1xx Y Kzz −KzxK−1xxKxz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=M2

−1
.
In order to impose the zero-block pattern (24) to
the inverse, we make the block in position (1, 1) in
−A−11 B1(D1 − C1A−11 B1)
−1
vanish. Note that we need to
compute explicitly only the elements in the first column block
of M2−1. Let[
A2 B2
C2 D2
]
:=
[
X − Y ∗Kxx−1Y Z − Y ∗Kxx−1Kxz
Z∗ −KzxK−1xx Y Kzz −KzxK−1xxKxz
]
= M2
(53)
Thus, in view of the matrix inversion lemma, the first column
block in M−12 is given by[
(A2 −B2D2−1C2)−1
−D2−1C2(A2 −B2D−12 C2)
−1
]
.
Therefore, orthogonality of x and v given z implies
0 = −Kxx−1
[
Y Kxz
] [ (A2 −B2D2−1C2)−1
−D2−1C2(A2 −B2D−12 C2)
−1
]
= −Kxx−1Y (A2 −B2D2−1C2)−1+
Kxx
−1KxzD2−1C2(A2 −B2D−12 C2)
−1
= Y −KxzD2−1C2,
so that
Y =Kxz
(
Kzz −KzxK−1xxKxz
)−1 (
Z∗ −KzxK−1xx Y
)
=
[(
I +Kxz
(
Kzz −KzxK−1xxKxz
)−1 ×
KzxKxx
−1)]−1Kxz (Kzz −KzxK−1xxKxz)−1 Z∗
=KxzK
−1
zz Z
∗.
In this way, we have parametrized all the matrices K[ x
v
z
]
whose inverse has the specified structure. At this point, we
could minimize the divergence D(pxv‖pxy) over Z and X .
This turns out to be an easy problem that can be solved in
closed form. This solution, however, is not the solution6 of our
original problem since there is yet another (hidden) constraint
that we need to impose. Namely we have to impose that the
matrix
K[ x
v
z
] =
 Kxx KxzK−1zz Z∗ Kxz(KxzK−1zz Z∗)∗ X Z
K∗xz Z
∗ Kzz
 (54)
is a bona fide covariance matrix, i.e. it is positive semidefinite.
Since K[ x
z
] is positive definite, this constraint is equivalent
to
X−[(KxzK−1zz Z∗)∗ Z] [Kxx KxzK∗xz Kzz
]−1 [
KxzK
−1
zz Z
∗
Z∗
]
≥ 0
which, with simple algebraic manipulations, is seen to be
equivalent to
X − ZK−1zz Z∗ ≥ 0. (55)
The positivity constraint is then automatically satisfied if we
re-parametrize the unknown matrix X in term of a new matrix
C in the form
X = ZK−1zz Z
∗ + CC∗. (56)
The optimal solution can be now easily obtained by solving
the following unconstrained optimization problem
arg min
C,Z
D(pxv‖pxy). (57)
Since
K[ x
v
](Z,C) :=
 Kxx KxzK−1zz Z∗
Z(KxzK
−1
zz )
∗ ZK−1zz Z
∗ + CC∗
 , (58)
K[ x
y
] := [Kxx Kxy
K∗xy Kyy
]
, (59)
6Here we mention this simplified optimization problem because, as dis-
cussed later, it turns out to be very useful as the first step of an efficient
numerical procedure that computes the solution of our original problem.
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D[J(Kxv(Z,C)); δKxv(Z,C)]
= trace
[
(−K−1xv +Kxy−1)δKxv
]
= trace
(−K−1xv +Kxy−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:∆
[
0 KxzK
−1
zz δZ
∗
δZ(KxzK
−1
zz )
∗ δZK−1zz Z
∗ + ZK−1zz δZ
∗ + δCC∗ + CδC∗
]
= trace
[[
∆11 ∆12
∆21 ∆22
] [
0 KxzK
−1
zz δZ
∗
δZ(KxzK
−1
zz )
∗ δZK−1zz Z
∗ + ZK−1zz δZ
∗ + δCC∗ + CδC∗
]]
= trace
[
∆12δZ(KxzK
−1
zz )
∗ ∗
∗ ∆21KxzK−1zz δZ∗ + ∆22
[
δZK−1zz Z
∗ + ZK−1zz δZ
∗ + δCC∗ + CδC∗
]].
(61)
solving (57) is equivalent to compute
arg min
Z,C
{
− log det(K[ x
v
](Z,C)K[ x
y
]−1)+
traceK[ x
y
]−1KxvK[ x
v
](Z,C)} . (60)
We are then led to the formulation of Problem 1. Let
J(K[ x
v
](Z,C)) := − log det(K[ x
v
](Z,C)K−1[ x
y
])+
traceK−1[ x
y
]K[ x
v
](Z,C). (62)
Its first variation is provided by (61) at the top of the page.
By the properties of the trace and the Hermitian symmetry,
we get that the first variation vanishes if and only if
trace
[(
(KxzK
−1
zz )
∗∆12 + Z∗K−1zz ∆22
)
δZ + C∗∆22δC
]
= 0.
(63)
This holds for all δZ, δC if and only if{
(KxzK
−1
zz )
∗∆12 +K−1zz Z
∗∆22 = 0
C∗∆22 = 0
(64)
The first equation in (64) can be simplified so that it reads
Kxz∆12 + Z
∗∆22 = 0. (65)
The matrix inversion lemma allows to compute an explicit
expression for matrix ∆
∆12 = −K−1xxKxy(Kyy −KyxK−1xxKxy)−1+
K−1xxKxzK
−1
zz Z
∗×[
ZK−1zz (Kzz −KzxK−1xxKxz)K−1zz Z∗ + CC∗
]−1
,
∆22 =
(
Kyy −KyzK−1xxKxy
)−1−[
ZK−1zz (Kzz −KzxK−1xxKxz)K−1zz Z∗ + CC∗
]−1
.
Now, let A := Kyy − KyxK−1xxKxy , and B := Kzz −
KzxK
−1
xxKxz. Then we can write
∆12 = −K−1xxKxyA−1 +K−1xxKxzK−1zz Z∗×[
ZK−1zz BK
−1
zz Z
∗ + CC∗
]−1
,
∆22 = A
−1 − (ZK−1zz BK−1zz Z∗ + CC∗)−1 .
Therefore, after some manipulation, we conclude that the
optimum solution is provided by C,Z such that
C∗ = C∗(ZK−1zz BK
−1
zz Z
∗ + CC∗)−1A
Z∗ = KzxK−1xxKxy +BK
−1
zz Z
∗×
(ZK−1zz BK
−1
zz Z
∗ + CC∗)−1A
. (66)
